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long with many other advanced economies, Australia faces an ageing 
population as a result of declining fertility over the last few decades and 
increasing longevity.  The OECD (2003:1) is sounding the alarm on the 
economic effects of ageing, predicting falling living standards unless remedial 
policy action is taken. 
If nothing is done quickly to extend working lives, living standards will 
fall in the course of the coming decades.  We know, because of the 
ageing of our population, that there will be fewer and fewer persons of 
working age to support more and more older people.  For the OECD as a 
whole, the dependence ratio of older people (i.e. those aged 65 and over 
as a proportion of those aged 20-64) will rise from the current figure of 
22 per cent to 46 per cent in 2050.  
Given current policy commitments to government funding of pensions and 
health and aged-care, the ageing of the population over the next fifty years is 
predicted to increase demands on the public purses of OECD countries by, on 
average, between six and seven percent of GDP (OECD, 2001b).   
The demographic changes facing Australia are likely to be slightly less severe 
than the OECD average.  This is partly because the fertility rate amongst 
Australian women has not fallen as low as it has in many European countries, and 
also because Australia runs a relatively large immigration program.  Projections in 
the inaugural Intergenerational Report (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002) 
suggest that the most likely outcome is a doubling in the aged dependency ratio 
(defined as the population aged over 64 relative to the population aged 15-64) 
from 19 per cent to 40 per cent over the next forty years.  Age-sensitive demands 
on the public purse are projected to rise by five percent of GDP over the same 
period, with the rising needs of the elderly offset slightly by reduced spending on 
education as the proportion of young people in the population diminishes.  These 
projections are summarised in Table 1. 
Intergenerational equity is one of the primary concerns of those who are 
alarmed at the implications of these demographic changes.  They are concerned 
that the living standards of future generations will be adversely and unfairly 
affected by the increase in the dependency ratio and the potential increase in the 
tax burden.   
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Table 1:  Demographic and Fiscal Projections 
 2002 2042 
Ratio of ‘Dependents’ to Population Aged 15-64 (per cent) 
Population 65+   19 40 
Population 0-14 29 24 
Population 0-14 and 65+ 48 64 
Ratio of Commonwealth ‘Demographic Spending’ to GDP (per cent) 
Elderly:  health, care and pensions 7.6 14.5 
Families, unemployment, children and education 4.8 3.5 
Total 14.0 19.0 
Source: Commonwealth of Australia (2002):Tables 3 and 13.   
In response to these concerns a raft of policy proposals have been canvassed.  
OECD (2003) calls for policies aimed at increasing the labour force participation 
by people aged between 55 and 64, trying to reverse the trend of early retirement.  
They advocate reductions in access to long-term sickness and disability pensions 
and unemployment benefits, as well as re-training schemes for older workers and 
reductions in discrimination on the basis of age.  Finally, they call for a major 
change in community attitudes (OECD, 2003:1):  
... workers must also understand that early retirement is not a vested right 
and that they must get used to the idea of a longer career, perhaps taking 
on different jobs towards the end of their working lives. 
While this forced-labour rhetoric is not likely to go down too well in 
Australia, it illustrates the pressures on public policy that are being generated in the 
debate over the ageing of the population.  Other responses that have been 
canvassed locally include policies to increase fertility - see McDonald (2001) — as 
well as policies to further stimulate private superannuation and private medical 
insurance and to contain the costs of health care for the elderly.  Some of these 
policy changes may well be desirable in their own right.  However, the purpose of 
this paper is not to debate the optimal policy response to population ageing.  
Rather, it argues that the problematic nature of this current demographic transition 
has been overstated and that policy debate should not be rushed into hasty and 
drastic conclusions by undue pessimism.  In particular we suggest that the ageing-
pessimists are failing to consider a number of important countervailing factors: 
• The decline in fertility over the past few decades is linked to a concurrent 
strong rise in labour force participation of Australian women as well as a 
subsequent rise in average educational attainment. 
• This increase in educational capital is likely to sustain strong productivity 
growth into the future. 
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• Despite the projected increase in dependency, with continuing productivity 
growth real incomes in forty years time will be such that living standards will 
be much higher than they are today. 
• Given that much of the increase in the living standards of the next generation 
is driven by the investments of the current generation in both physical and 
human capital, projected increases in the tax burden do not appear to be 
inequitable.  Rather than being a burden on the next generation, the current 
generation is probably a benefactor.  
Part of our argument is similar to that of Guest and McDonald (2001).  They 
assume that multi-factor productivity will grow at one percent per year. Allowing 
for optimal savings and investment behaviour, they predict that average living 
standards will rise strongly despite the ageing of the population.  We reinforce this 
finding, which essentially reflects the power of compound growth.  Even a fairly 
slow rate of growth in productivity will raise real income per worker to such an 
extent that the predicted demographic changes will make only a dent in the growth 
of income averaged over the whole population.  We go beyond the Guest and 
McDonald argument by considering the endogeneity of technical progress to 
investment in education, whereas they treat productivity growth as exogenous.   
We argue that the human capital created through education is not only a 
productive input which directly raises productivity, it also plays a crucial role in 
the development and adoption of new technologies that drive long-run growth.     
Furthermore, we examine theory and evidence concerning labour force 
participation and fertility, which suggest that rising levels of education play an 
important role in decisions on family size.  We conclude that rising educational 
attainment, the factor that has driven the fall in fertility, is also acting to mitigate 
the effects of rising dependency rates by raising the growth rate of productivity.   
Fertility, Human Capital and Labour Force Participation 
As living standards rise, families tend to have less children and the population 
growth rate falls.  This is evident in the historical development of many countries 
that have progressed beyond the Malthusian poverty trap.  This section reviews the 
literature exploring the interdependency of fertility and economic growth. 
While it is true that people tend to live longer as living standards rise, there is 
little theoretical analysis endogenising longevity. On the other hand, work on 
endogenous fertility has proliferated.  This literature applies rational choice 
analysis to parental choice over fertility, savings, and investment in the education 
of children.  To some people it is offensive to treat fertility as an economic choice 
variable.  Of course there will always be cultural and religious factors and 
idiosyncratic variations that affect fertility choices.  But these economic-
demography models do have substantial explanatory power in relation to the 
aggregate outcomes that are relevant for macroeconomic analysis.  
Various motives are adduced for fertility choice in this literature.  Parents 
may expect to get satisfaction from family life, they may value children 
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altruistically, and they may expect to get income support and companionship in 
old age.  On the other hand children come at a cost, with some models 
distinguishing between the cost of rearing and the cost of education. 
The principal theoretical contributions have come from Barro and Becker 
(1988), Becker, Murphy and Tamura (1990), Ehrlich and Lui (1991), and Galor 
and Weil (1996 and 2000).  In these analyses, increased female labour force 
participation and accumulation of capital, particularly human capital, are the 
driving forces that simultaneously raise income levels and reduce fertility.  A 
feature common to most of these models is that economic growth, characterised by 
rising productivity and wages, has conflicting income and substitution effects on 
fertility.  A rise in income means parents can afford to have more children; but the 
opportunity cost of rearing children (time out of the labour force) also rises.  The 
latter has tended to dominate in advanced economies and women’s participation in 
the labour force has risen and fertility has declined with economic growth.   
Economic growth and fertility are also linked through education and the 
accumulation of human capital.  A rise in levels of human capital investment, such 
as an increase in educational attainment, has two distinct effects on that generation 
of young people as they enter adulthood.  Not only do they have higher earning 
potential, but also they are more productive as educators of the next generation.  
So the return to investment in their children’s education rises relative to the return 
to investment in the quantity of children.  This ‘quality-quantity tradeoff’, a phrase 
coined by Becker and Lewis (1973), furthers the dynamic interaction between 
rising productivity and falling fertility.  We draw two key predictions from this 
literature.  Declining fertility of the current generation is associated with: 
• rising female labor force participation of the current generation; and 
• rising education levels of the future generation. 
An overall inter-relationship between economic growth and fertility receives 
empirical support.  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Barro and Lee (1994) 
estimate fertility equations using cross-country data over 1965-1985.  They find a 
negative relation between per capita income and fertility holds for all but the 
poorest countries.  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) estimate that fertility declines 
with economic growth for countries where real per capita GDP is above $767 
(1985 US dollars).  Only 13 of the 102 countries in their regression sample were 
below this critical level.  Using a 1950-1990 time series for four G7 countries, 
Cigno and Rosati (1996) estimate that fertility is affected positively by the male 
wage rate and negatively by the female wage rate.  Rising male wages have a pure 
income effect, whereas rising female wages imply both an income effect and a 
substitution effect, as women primarily face the choice between child rearing and 
labour force participation.  The sum of the wage coefficients is negative, 
suggesting the substitution effect associated with rising incomes dominates.   
Rosenzweig (1990) draws on cross-sectional micro data for three developing 
countries, as well as time series from India to find evidence of a quality-quantity 
trade-off as per the second prediction.  In all three countries, children’s schooling 
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responds positively and significantly to variations in parental income across 
households.  Changes in fertility and schooling in Indian farm households, 1961-
71 further supports a quality-quantity trade-off.  
In Australia, the first of the predictions accords with the experience of the last 
four decades.  As illustrated in Figure 1, the decline in fertility since the 1960s —
from an expected three to just under two births per woman — has been 
accompanied by a substantial rise in the rate of women’s participation in the 
labour force.  While much of the rise has taken the form of part-time employment, 
there has been only a slight decrease in the average hours of work for women.  So 
the participation figures do reflect a large rise in the supply of labour.   
Figure 1:  Fertility, schooling and female labour force participation 
Source:  RBA Australian Economic Statistics 1964-96 and ABS 6202.0 - Labour Force 
(Preliminary) for participation rates; Collins, Kenway and McLeod (2000), Figure 33, for 
retention rates as a percentage of cohort entering secondary education; and Births, 
Australia (ABS 3301.0) for fertility rates. 
 
The second prediction of the endogenous fertility literature also accords with 
Australian experience over the last few decades.  Again referring to Figure 1, the 
sharp fall in fertility beginning in 1970 is reflected in a subsequent take-off in 
Year 12 retention rates in the mid 1980’s.  It seems that Australian parents did 
indeed trade-off between investment in quantity and quality for their children. 
Human Capital Investment and Productivity:  Level or Growth Effects 
To assess the contribution of rising levels of education to Australian productivity 
growth, we need to distinguish between ‘level effects’ and ‘growth effects’.  The 
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former refer to a relationship between the steady-state level of productivity and the 
rate of accumulation of human capital.  The latter refer to a relationship between 
the stock of human capital and the long-run rate of growth of productivity. 
The neo-classical view, championed by Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), is 
that human capital is a productive input subject to diminishing returns. This 
implies that higher investment will raise the long-run level of labour productivity 
but will affect the rate of productivity growth only during the transition to the new 
steady-state.  In the long-run, diminishing returns bring the economy back to a 
steady-state where growth is determined by exogenous technical progress. 
Proponents of the ‘new’ growth theory — Lucas (1988) and Romer (1990) 
are prominent examples — have advocated the view that investment in embodied 
human capital (through child-rearing, education and training) and investment in 
disembodied knowledge (through R&D) differs fundamentally from investment in 
machinery and equipment, and is not necessarily subject to diminishing returns.  
Policies that affect the stock of human capital have the potential to affect the long-
run rate of growth of productivity: growth is endogenous.  The essential argument 
of the new growth theory is that knowledge is non-rivalrous and that its 
accumulation exhibits positive feedback.  For example, the idea of an arch can be 
used simultaneously in the construction of one bridge or a hundred bridges at no 
extra cost; and the idea of the arch can inspire further developments in the 
technology of construction.  As the stock of non-rivalrous knowledge grows, so 
researchers have an ever-broader field on which to make new discoveries.   
Human capital can influence the long-run growth of productivity in two 
ways.  The more researchers and the higher their skill levels, the faster the rate at 
which innovations are generated in research and development.  Increasing the skill 
level of the workforce will also increase the ease and efficiency with which new 
technologies are introduced into the workplace.  Both of these factors have 
probably been at play in the successful introduction over the past decade of the 
new computer and Internet technologies in Australian workplaces. 
Estimates of the ‘Level’ Effects of Investment in Human Capital  
Microeconomic studies in many countries have found that each extra year of 
schooling raises an individual’s earnings by an amount in the range of five to 12 
per cent.  Findings by Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) on US data are confirmed 
by Australian studies such as Miller, Mulvey and Martin (1995), who analyse the 
earnings of twins and report that the return to a year of education lies between 4.5 
per cent and 8.3 per cent, and Preston (1997) who reports high rates of return to 
advanced educational qualifications.  The results of Miller et al. are particularly 
interesting because they control for the influences of genetic and domestic 
background to identify the direct contribution of education to subsequent earnings. 
These estimates of the returns to education are supported by cross-country 
macroeconomic studies investigating the link between economic growth and the 
growth in educational attainment of the workforce in OECD economies.  For 
instance, Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) estimate the determinants of countries’ 
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steady-state income levels as a function of investment in both physical and human 
capital.  For their cross-section of OECD countries, they estimate an elasticity of 
0.76 between steady-state output per worker and the rate of investment in 
education, which they proxy by secondary school enrolment as a proportion of the 
workforce.  Translating the elasticity into the marginal impact of an additional 
year of schooling, this implies that steady-state output per worker would increase 
by fifteen percent if average secondary schooling were to increase from five to six 
years.  Bassanini and Scarpetta (2002) analyse annual panel data for 21 OECD 
countries from 1971 to 1998, concluding that the effect of an additional year of 
schooling is a six percent increase in steady-state output.   
Some researchers argue that the microeconomic correlation between years of 
schooling and subsequent earnings might be due to the role of education as a 
signalling device, informing employers of people’s natural abilities, rather than 
education actually adding to people’s productivity.  However, the fact that 
macroeconomic growth studies and microeconomic wage studies come up with 
broadly similar estimates suggests that the wage effect of education does indeed 
reflect increased productivity.   
What are the implications of these estimates for Australia?  A rise of one year 
in the average educational attainment of the workforce is predicted to increase 
labour productivity and steady-state real GDP by around eight percent, to take a 
fairly conservative point estimate. This increase in the level of GDP will take 
place gradually.  A one-year increase in the length of schooling of teenagers will 
only increase the average educational experience of the adult population as the 
new, better-educated cohorts enter the workforce, replacing older cohorts.  The 
transition lasts four decades, as people enter the labour force aged 16-20 and exit 
at an age of about 60.  During the transition period the annual growth rate of GDP 
will be 0.2 percentage points above trend, after which time the growth rate will 
revert to trend with output eight percent higher than it would have been in the 
absence of the schooling increase.   
Estimates of the Growth Effects of Investment in Human Capital 
An increase in the level of human capital will increase the long-run rate of growth 
of the economy if the stock of human capital influences the rate of development 
and introduction of new technologies, as argued by Nelson and Phelps (1966).  A 
better educated work force can more readily identify, adapt and implement new 
ideas — whether the ideas are generated domestically or overseas.  This 
hypothesis receives empirical support from cross-country growth studies. 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) compare models that treat human capital as a 
direct input into production with models treating human capital as an intermediate 
input into the acquisition of skills and/or knowledge.  Their cross-country study 
favours the latter model.  This finding is confirmed by Frantzen (2000) and by 
Dowrick and Rogers (2002).  The predicted growth effects of schooling are 
summarised in Table 2.  Averaging these estimates suggests a boost to annual 
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economic growth of one half of a percentage point for every additional year of 
schooling in the adult population.     
Table 2: Predicted Growth Effects from an Additional Year of Schooling  
 Increase in long-run rate of growth of productivity 
Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) 0.3 percentage points 
Frantzen (2000) 0.8 percentage points 
Dowrick & Rogers (2002)1  0.3 percentage points 
1  This estimate is from the coefficients in Table 3 of the paper, using the sample of 35 relatively 
rich economies with better data quality. 
This macroeconomic evidence is reinforced by a study of industry-level 
productivity growth covering 12 industries in 13 OECD countries since 1970 - see 
Griffith, Redding and Van Reenen (2000).  Although Australia is not included in 
their sample, we can draw on the results reported in their Table 9 for countries like 
Denmark and Norway.   In smallish countries that have a similar level of labour 
productivity to that of Australia, approximately forty percent of the rate of 
productivity growth is attributable to technology transfer from other countries. Not 
only do high levels of domestic R&D and educational attainment stimulate the 
growth of total factor productivity, but also the returns are significantly higher for 
industries operating below the international technological frontier.  They interpret 
these findings as evidence that both R&D and education have twin effects; they 
stimulate the rate of domestic innovation and they increase the capacity of 
industries to absorb ideas from the overseas technological leaders.     
Implications for Growth and the Costs of an Ageing Population 
The capacity of the working-age population to support an increasing elderly 
population depends not only on changes in productivity but also on changes in 
labour force participation.  This section attempts to quantify the extent to which 
rising education and lowered fertility are likely to offset the effects of an ageing 
population by promoting faster productivity growth and higher participation. 
We start with a decomposition of GDP per capita (output averaged across the 
total population) into two components:  output per working-age person, and the 
dependency rate. 
Y Y Popw Popdep
Pop Popw Popw
+= ÷  (1) 
 
In this identity, Y represents GDP. Pop is the total population, composed of 
Popw, the working-age population, and Popdep, the dependent population.  The 
last term in equation (1) is equal to (1 + the dependency ratio).  
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Taking logarithms of both sides and differentiating with respect to time, we 
derive the result that:  
Growth of GDP per capita = growth rate of output per working-age person  
 - growth rate of (1 + dependency ratio) (2) 
 
The total dependency ratio, as listed in Table 1, is projected to rise from 48 
per cent to 64 per cent by 2042.  This is equivalent to an annual average growth 
rate of 0.0026 in the term (1+dependency ratio).  In other words, the ageing of the 
Australian population implies that the annual growth rate of GDP per capita over 
the next forty years will be one quarter of a percentage point below the growth rate 
of output per working-age person. 
It is useful to further decompose output per working-age person into the 
familiar economic concepts of productivity, the participation rate and the 
unemployment rate: 
Y Y H L E
popw H E popw L
= × × ×  (3) 
 
The additional variables are aggregate hours worked (H), employment (E) 
and the labour force (L).  Using this identity, we can decompose the rate of growth 
of output in terms of the growth rates of the four component ratios: 
 
Growth of  output per working-age person (4) 
 = growth of hourly labour productivity  (Y/H) (i) 
 + growth of average hours per worker  (H/E)  (ii) 
 + growth of labour force participation  (L/popw)  (iii) 
 - change in the unemployment rate1  (iv)  
 
For the purposes of our projections over the next forty years, we ignore 
changes in the unemployment rate.  Whilst the unemployment rate rose sharply in 
the 1970s, there has been no clear trend since.  Moreover, even if the 
unemployment rate were to rise or fall by as much as four percentage points over 
the next forty years, that would contribute only one tenth of a percentage point to 
the annual average rate of growth of real output.  The most important factors that 
will determine output levels in forty years time are the growth rates of productivity 
and of the supply of hours of labour per person of working-age.  The supply of 
hours is the product of average hours of work and labour force participation, terms 
(ii) and (iii) in equation (4).  We examine these factors in turn.  
Labour Productivity and Increasing Levels of Human Capital 
Before considering the impact of human capital, we look at the growth record for 
GDP per capita and for labour productivity over the past thirty years both in the 
whole economy and in the market sector.  Summary data are given in Table 3.   
                                                          
1  Here we use the relationship that E/L = (1-ur), where ur is the unemployment rate, and 
the first-order approximation: dlog((1-ur)/dt = -d(ur)/dt.   
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Table 3:  Average Rates of Growth of GDP per Capita and Labour 
Productivity (per cent, per year) 
  1971/72 to 
2001/02 
1971/72 to 
1981/82 
1981/82 to 
1991/92 
1991/82 to 
2001/02 
Whole Economy Real GDP per capita 1.9% 1.6% 1.2% 2.7% 
 Gross product/hour worked1   1.1% 2.1% 
Market Sector Output per hour 2.2% 2.6% 1.5% 2.6% 
1. Series starts 1978/79 
Source:  National Accounts (ABS 5204.0) 
Growth in real GDP per capita has averaged 1.9 per cent per year since 1971, 
falling slightly in the 1980s but recovering strongly in the 1990s.  However, this is 
not a good measure of labour productivity since it is influenced by changes in both 
the participation rate and the dependency rate.  Gross product per hour worked in 
the whole economy has been growing somewhat slower than per capita output.  
This is still an imperfect measure of labour productivity because of problems in 
the measurement of non-marketed services — particularly for the public sector 
where the Australian Bureau of Statistics adopts the practice of attributing zero 
productivity growth.  The most reliable measure is for the market sector, where we 
observe a thirty-year average growth rate of 2.2 per cent per year. 
Figure 2:  Labour Productivity and GDP per capita, 1971/2 to 2001/2 
Source: National Accounts (ABS 5204.0).  All series indexed to 100 in 1978/79.  
 
In Figure 2 we display time series indexes of market sector productivity and 
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1978/79.   Note that the indexes are scaled logarithmically, so a straight line 
represents a constant rate of proportional growth and a steeper line represents a 
faster rate of growth. Whichever measure we use, we observe a similar pattern.  
Productivity growth fell in the 1980s before recovering strongly in the 1990s.  
Both GDP per capita and hourly productivity in the market sector have been 
growing at an average rate of 2 per cent per year since 1978/79, implying that 
changes in dependency have been exactly offset by changes in the supply of hours.  
In considering whether the 2 per cent trend in productivity growth is likely to 
continue, we need to take account of changes in the educational attainment of the 
workforce.  A useful, albeit incomplete, measure of the level of education of a 
cohort is given by the proportion of secondary school children who stay on to 
Year 12.  This proportion more than doubled from 35 per cent in 1980 to over 70 
per cent in the 1990s — see Figure 1.  Particularly noteworthy is the huge rise in 
educational attainment of Australian girls. Close to 80 per cent of the current 
generation of young Australian women (born between 1975 and 1980) have 
completed Year 12 of their schooling.  In their parents’ generation, born between 
1940 and 1950, less than one quarter of girls continued to Year 12.   
Table 4: Level of Highest Educational Attainment Amongst 
Population Aged 20-64 in 2001, by Cohort 
Age at 
May 2001 
Bachelor or 
Postgraduate 
Degree 
Diploma or
Certificate 
III or IV 
Year 12 Year 11 Year 10 and Below TOTAL
1 
 Thousands  (per cent of cohort) 
55-64 230 365 162 76 836 1669 
 (14) (22) (10) (5) (50) (100) 
45-54 499 594 315 170 933 2511 
 (20) (24) (13) (7) (37) (100) 
35-44 572 529 435 240 849 2625 
 (22) (20) (17) (9) (32) (100) 
25-34 686 685 628 231 564 2794 
 (25) (25) (22) (8) (20) (100) 
20-24 190 258 595 101 198 1342 
 (14) (19) (44) (8) (15) (100) 
20-64 2177 2431 2135 818 3380 10941 
 (20) (22) (20) (7) (31) (100) 
Note:  1 = Excluding the small numbers of people recorded as Certificate I or II or not defined. 
Source:  ABS 6227.0 (2002): Education and Work, Australia, Table 10. 
If the historically high school retention rates of the 1990s are maintained, and 
continue to have a flow-on effect into higher education, then the average level of 
education in the workforce will rise substantially over the next three decades.  As 
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shown in Table 4, we can predict the likely rate of increase by examining current 
levels of educational attainment among the working-age population.  
Among the oldest of these cohorts, those aged between 55 and 64 in 2001, 
only one in seven has a university degree and one half never progressed beyond 
Year 10 at school (moreover, it is likely that a substantial proportion of these 
attained only primary education).  With each successive cohort there is a 
progression to higher levels of attainment.  Amongst the 25-34 age cohort, 80 
percent have gone beyond Year 10 and the proportion with university degrees is 
nearly double that of their parents’ generation.  
The figures for completed degrees and diplomas amongst the 20-24 age group 
are lower than those of the 25-34 group because many of this group have not yet 
completed their studies.  But we do know that 85 per cent of this younger cohort 
has progressed beyond Year 10.  We predict the average years of educational 
attainment of this cohort by assuming that the proportions of those going beyond 
Year 10 to reach each of the higher grades are the same as the proportions 
observed for the 25-34 group.   
Figure 3:  Post-Year 10 Attainment and Estimated Average Years of 
Education, by cohort 
Source: Attainment data are from ABS 6227.0 (2002):  Education and Work, Australia, Table 10.  
Estimates of average years of education assume an average of 3.7 years of education for 
the post-Year 10 group; for ‘Year 10 or lower’ assumed average years of education are as 
follows:  9 years if born before 1956; 10 years if born 1956-65; 11 years if born after 1966.   
Estimates of the average years of education of each cohort are presented in 
Figure 3.  While these estimates rely on assumptions about the average years of 
education associated with each cohort’s attainments, the overall average of 
thirteen years of education matches closely the estimates in OECD (2001a). 
50%
63%
68%
80%
85%
69.3%
10.9
12.6
13.2
14.0
13.0
14.2
40%
45%
50%
55%
60%
65%
70%
75%
80%
85%
90%
55-64 45-54 35-44 25-34 20-24 20-64
Age at May 2001
pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 c
oh
or
t
10.5
11.0
11.5
12.0
12.5
13.0
13.5
14.0
14.5
av
er
ag
e 
ye
ar
s 
of
 a
tta
in
m
en
t
% of cohort above Year 10 (left scale)
Average years of education of cohort (right
scale)
Ageing Economics:  Human Capital, Productivity and Fertility 
 
15
As the highly educated younger cohorts have replaced less educated older 
generations over the past forty years, average years of education in the working-
age population has risen by more than three years according to OECD (2001a).  
We expect this process to continue, as the youngest cohort currently entering the 
labour force has an educational advantage of more than three years over the 
retiring cohort.    
We must, however, expect that the rate of increase in educational attainment 
will slow relative to its pace since 1960. The growth of the proportion of each 
cohort that goes beyond Year 10 is slowing — as it must, given an absolute upper 
limit of 100 per cent.  If current attainment levels persist into the future, the 
average years of education in the working-age population will rise from its current 
level of 13 years to reach a steady-state level of 14.2 years by 2041.   
This slow-down in the rate of increase of educational attainment does not 
necessarily imply a reduction in the contribution of education to economic growth 
over the next forty years.  We have argued that there are two distinct mechanisms 
by which human capital affects growth. The first is the ‘levels’ effect by which an 
increase in the stock of human capital used in production increases the steady-state 
level of productivity, with a corresponding transitional growth effect.  A 
slowdown in the rate of growth of educational attainment implies that this 
contribution to growth will diminish.  But the second mechanism is the ‘growth 
effect’, by which a higher stock of human capital enables more rapid technological 
progress.  Since the average stock of human capital over the next 40 years will be 
higher than the average over the past 40 years, the growth effect implies an 
acceleration of productivity.   
In Table 5 we summarise our calculations of these two effects, comparing 
estimates of the contribution of education over the past forty years with its 
expected contribution over the next forty years.   
The reduction in growth due to the slowdown in the rate of growth of 
educational attainment (the level effect) is more than offset by the growth effect 
resulting from the increased stock of human capital.  The net effect of expected 
changes in the educational attainment of the adult population is to increase the 
annual rate of productivity growth by 0.22 percentage points over the next forty 
years.  This is a conservative prediction in that we have used the lower of the 
estimated growth coefficients reported in Table 2 and we have assumed no further 
rise in years of educational attainment amongst young Australians. 
The Supply of Hours 
There are two components to trends in labour supply: the participation rate, 
defined as the ratio of the labour force to working-age population, and the average 
hours worked per employee.  The product of these two ratios is the supply of 
hours per person of working-age. 
Data from Australian Bureau of Statistics (2003) tells the following story for 
the supply of labour amongst persons aged 15-64 over the period 1980 to 2002.  
Falling male participation was more than offset by a strong rise in female 
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participation, leading to an increase in overall participation from 69 per cent to 75 
per cent.  While average hours of work fell slightly for both men and women, the 
supply of hours per person of working-age rose from 24.2 hours to 25.2 hours per 
week.  This represents a rate of growth of 0.2 per cent per year. 
Table 5: Estimated Impact of Rising Education on Productivity 
Growth 
 1960-2000 2000-2040 
Increase in average years of education of 
the working-age population 1 3.4 years 1.2 years 
Predicted effects on the annual percentage rate of growth of productivity 
‘Transitional Level effect’ 2 
 = 0.2 x change in years of education over 
a forty year period 
0.2 x 3.4 = 0.68 0.2 x 1.2 = 0.24  
‘Long-run Growth effect’3 = 0.3 x 
[(average years of education 2000-40) – 
(average years of education 1960-2000)] 
 0.3 x 2.2 = 0.66  
Predicted change in productivity growth 
rate relative to previous period  
0.24 + 0.66 – 
0.68 = + 0.22  
Notes: 1. The 1960-2000 increase is taken from OECD (2001a) which shows average years of 
schooling increasing from 9.84 in 1960 to 12.88 in 1990 and to 13.01 in 1995.  We 
assume that the increase 1995-2000 is the same as the increase 1990-95.  The increase 
2000-2040 is a projection based on the assumption that educational attainment levels of 
future cohorts entering the adult population are maintained at their 2001 current levels, 
14.2 years. 
2. Predicted effect on annual productivity growth over forty years, using an estimate of an 8 
per cent rise in the level of steady-state output per effective worker for each additional 
year of average education in the workforce (see discussion in previous section). 
3. This is the predicted effect on long-run rate of productivity growth from the change in 
the average level of education between each period, using the lower of the estimates 
from Table 2 of 0.3 percentage points for each additional year of average education.  
Implications for Growth in Output per Person 
The relationship between annual growth rates of productivity, labour supply, and 
output per person are displayed in Table 6, based on the growth accounting 
relationships of equations (2) and (4).  The three rows of the table represent 
pessimistic, baseline and optimistic scenarios.  The baseline scenario (the shaded 
second row) assumes that the rate of labour productivity growth is unchanged 
from its average over the past 25 years (2.0 per cent per year).  We have argued 
that this is a conservative assumption, since increasing levels of education suggest 
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an increase in the rate of productivity growth. The baseline scenario also assumes 
no further increase in the supply of hours of labour per working-age person. 
Table 6: Scenarios for Rates of Growth in Output per Person 
(per cent, per year) 
 
assumed growth 
of hourly labour 
productivity  
assumed growth 
in supply of 
hours of labour 
per person of 
working age 
growth in GDP 
per person of 
working-age 
growth in 
(1+dependency 
ratio) 
growth in GDP 
per capita 
 (i) (ii) (i) + (ii) = (iii) (iv) (iii) – (iv) = (v) 
1. 1.5 0 1.5 0.26 1.24 
2. 2.0 0 2.0 0.26 1.74 
3. 2.2. 0.2  2.4 0.26 2.14 
 
The ‘optimistic’ scenario, in the third row of the table, factors in the effects 
on productivity of rising, albeit decelerating, levels of education.  Using the 
estimates derived in Table 5, this implies productivity growth of 2.2 per cent per 
year.  We also allow for the strong trend in female labour force participation to 
continue to drive the overall supply of hours per working-age person at the 
average rate of 0.2 per cent per year that has obtained since 1980. 
Working with our baseline scenario, the growth rate of GDP per capita is 
predicted to grow at 1.74 per cent per year — slightly slower than the 2 per cent 
average rate of growth over the past few decades because of the expected rise in 
dependency rates.  Under our more optimistic scenario, the benefits of increasing 
levels of human capital are predicted to outweigh the dependency effect, leading 
to a per capita growth rate of 2.14 per cent per year.   
The pessimistic scenario allows for adverse changes in Australia’s 
institutional or policy settings, which might have the effect of reducing labour 
productivity growth.  For example, policy changes that discouraged investment 
could lead to a slowdown in capital accumulation.  A slowdown in labour force 
growth could reduce productivity growth in the face of scale economies or, as 
discussed by Cutler, Poterba et al. (1990), if an ageing workforce loses 
‘dynamism’.  Allowing for a productivity slowdown of 0.5 percentage points 
below current trends, with no increase in the average supply of hours, per capita 
GDP growth would be 1.24 per cent per year.  
These findings can be compared with the predictions of Guest and McDonald 
(2001).  Their measure of average living standards, which is adjusted for the extra 
needs of the elderly and takes account of the projected ageing of the population, 
rises at an average annual rate of 1.2 per cent per year.  Taking account of the 
impact of rising levels of human capital on productivity and labour supply, we 
suggest that a more optimistic scenario is likely. 
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It is also of interest to examine the likely changes in real wages of the 
working-age population, taking into account the prediction of the Intergenerational 
Report that over the next forty years the fiscal burden of an ageing population may 
require an extra 5 per cent of GDP.  We factor this into our calculations as a rise in 
the tax rate from 30 per cent to 35 per cent of GDP.  Our results are presented in 
Table 7.  We assume that real wage growth is the same as real output growth, 
ignoring any changes in factor shares or in the terms of trade. 
Table 7: Growth in Real Incomes of the Working-age Population over 
Forty Years 
 annual growth in GDP per 
person of working-age 
cumulative growth in pre-
tax income over 40 years 
cumulative growth in post-
tax income with 5% 
additional levy 1 
1. 1.5% p.a. 81% 68% 
2. 2.0% p.a. 121% 105% 
3. 2.4% p.a. 158% 140% 
1  Assuming a rise in the average tax rate from 30 per cent to 35 per cent. 
Working with our baseline scenario, labour productivity and real incomes 
will be substantially more than double current levels in forty years time.  An 
increase in taxation of five percentage points of GDP to finance the rise in public 
expenditures, as forecast by the Intergenerational Report (2001), implies a rise in 
post-tax income of 105 per cent.  Even under a pessimistic scenario where labour 
productivity growth averages only 1.5 per cent per year, real after tax incomes 
would still increase by more than two-thirds.  In our more optimistic scenario, the 
real post-tax income of the working-age population increases by 140 percent.   
Conclusions 
The past forty years have witnessed a huge increase in the educational attainment 
of young Australians, in particular young women.  This shift in educational 
aspirations and achievement has had a profound effect on fertility and population 
growth.  As women have attained higher levels of education, so their potential 
earnings have risen and they have chosen to increase their participation in the 
labour force.  At the same time, parents have chosen to have fewer children but to 
invest more in their education.  A continuing rise in educational attainment over 
the next forty years, as highly educated young people replace less educated 
retirees, can be expected to increase the rate of productivity growth. 
The ageing of the Australian population is an inevitable result of the fact that 
the fertility rate has fallen and longevity has increased.  This implies that in future 
the working age population will be supporting a much larger elderly population 
than at present. We have shown, however, that the ageing of the population is not 
at all likely to impoverish the next generation of working Australians.  Whilst the 
Ageing Economics:  Human Capital, Productivity and Fertility 
 
19
working-age population is becoming smaller relative to the aged population, it is 
also becoming smarter and more productive and is increasing its supply of labour.   
Indeed, the very factor that has contributed to the decline in fertility, the rising 
educational attainment of young Australians, is the same factor that is likely to 
sustain rapid growth in productivity and income.     
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